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A slightly different version of this paper will appear in the forthcoming
conference proceedings.
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Water resource development often has been undertaken with a zeal unique in
both ambition and accomplishment. The taming and settlement of the American
West is largely a function of water resource projects providing irrigation as well
as municipal water in an arid and semi-arid landscape. Rivers, harbors and flood
control projects were equally impressive in scale and financial commitment.
These monuments to U.S. engineering expertise generated a great deal of national
pride

and development stimulus.

While the rate at which federal projects come

on line has decreased in recent years, portions

of the U.S. water resource

inventory remain heavily capitalized.
At the same time, the professional community as well as the popular press
recently have focused attention on the other side of the infrastructure picture.
Water delivery systems in many of the nation's older cities are seriously outdated
with corroding pipes and inadequate treatment facilities.

It is estimated that New
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York City's leakage loss amounts to 9 percent. Nationally, the cost to upgrade

water delivery systems is estimated by various sources to be between $3.7 and
$7.6 billion per year. 2

While significant progress has been made over the past

two decades in expanding and upgrading sewerage treatment facilities, EPA
estimates that it will require $76.2 billion to meet Clean Water standards by the
3
year 2005.

The paradox of water resource infrastructure in the U.S. is that at the same
time that a significant overcapitalization of facilities appears to exist in some
areas a significant undercapitalization of facilities and maintenance exists in still
other areas.

This disequilibrium suggests that capital markets with respect to

water resources are not functioning well.
How did capital markets with respect to water resource inventory become so
distorted, and what can be done about this situation?
answer these

questions.

This paper will try to

The first section provides an historical perspective on

the institutional structure that has evolved to develop
resource infrastructure in the U.S.

and administer water

With this background, the present

predicament is examined to better understand the nature of the problem and its
implications for U.S. water policy.

Finally, policy options are considered and

recommendations made to address this predicament.

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

To better understand the present predicament with respect to water resource
infrastructure, it is important to examine the historical context and institutional
framework in which water resource policies have evolved.

Principal actors in

terms of water resource development include federal, state, and local govern
ment and private water companies.

Federal Role

The federal role with respect to water resource development began with the
establishment of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1794.
missions to construct and maintain

From its original

coastal fortifications and to promote inland

navigation, the civilian component of the Corps eventually became more active
than

the military projects group.
Additional impetus for federal involvement grew out of the westward

expansion of the late nineteenth century. The Desert Lands Act of 1877 and the
Carey Act of 1894 offered low priced land to settlers that irrigated their land. By
the turn of the century, the best, most easily irrigated lands had been claimed.
Further development meant larger investments in resevoirs, dams, and diversion
canals.

Private irrigation companies were becoming financially strapped in

trying to expand irrigation potential, and many had become bankrupt in the
process (Frederick, 1986).
The Reclamation Act of 1902 provided an entree for the formal involvement
of the federal government in "planning, constructing, operating, and maintaining
facilities to store, regulate, and divert water for reclaiming the country's water
short areas."

An important policy initiative of the Theodore Roosevelt

Presidency, the legislation created the Reclamation Service, later renamed the
Bureau of Reclamation. With this new

responsibility, the federal government

embarked on a new era in U.S. water policy.
The mission of reclaiming the semi-arid west led to massive construction
projects, a restructuring of economic opportunity, and political intrigue affecting
project location and scale. Among the more noteworthy accomplishments of the
early years was the construction of Hoover Dam on the Lower Colorado River
completed in 1936. The project which took five years to complete and stood 726
feet tall was by far the largest construction project ever attempted.

Principal

beneficiaries of the project included the City of Los Angeles and the Imperial
Valley.
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The next great champion of federal water projects was another Roosevelt.
Now, however, federal public works included the additional justification of
economic stimulus during the

depths of the Depression.

Federal projects along

the Columbia River dwarfed Hoover Dam in scale. The largest of these dams, the
Grand Coulee, was twice the size of Hoover Dam. When planned in 1930, Grand
Coulee was to generate ten times the electricity demanded of the entire Pacific
Northwest.

At full operation, the system generated 2.1 million kilowatts of

electricity making it the single largest source of electricity in the world.

This

energy glut was closed considerably by the Second World War and the location of
much of the U.S. aluminum and aircraft industry in the region.
energy potential and consequent industrial capacity, it is
been the single most important factor

This tapped

speculated, may have

affecting the outcome of the war

(Reisner, 1986).
Development of the Upper Colorado River in the 1950's brought in

the

concept of River Basin Management to appropriate cumulative benefits within a
river basin to justify still further irrigation benefits for Bureau projects.
Corps was active as well.

The

Since flood control benefits were not subject to cost

recovery, additional projects were justified. Competition between the two
agencies culminated in the Pick-Sloan Project along the Missouri River.
In real dollar terms, federal outlays for construction projects peaked in
1965 at 3.7 billion dollars (1982=100).

Real annual

expenditures have

continued to decline during the Carter and Reagan Administrations. Real operation
and maintenance expenditures have continued to increase, doubling since the tate
1 9 5 0 's

(North, 1 9 8 7) .

While water resource development efforts stabilized or in some cases
declined, pollution control programs grew to more than fill this void.

With the

Environmental Protection Act and the Clean Water Act of 1972 and its
amendments, federal expenditures for water quality increased more than tenfold
between 1970 and 1977. Since 1973, water pollution programs have supplanted
water resource development programs as the principal natural resource
expenditure category.
Both water resource development and pollution control programs have been
affected by the political philosophy of the

Reagan Administration.

In nominal

terms, net outlays for natural resource programs peaked in 1980.

Water

resource development projects are likely to entail greater local cost sharing as
mandated in the Water Resource Development Act of 1986 (PL99-662}.
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In

terms of pollution control, the Clean Water Act of 1987 established guidelines and
funding for the establishment of state revolving funds to transfer greater
responsibility to state government.

State Role
State water law provides the rubiric in which water allocation decisions are
made. Yet, in terms of water resource finance, states traditionally have played an
intermediary role interfacing between federal initiatives and local water
providers.

With a

changing federal posture with respect to water policy, state

government is likely to experience the most drastic role reversal among
governmental units with regard to water resource policy and finance.
States of the eastern seaboard actively pursued inland navigation projects in
the early nineteenth century in an attempt to open western territories to their
ports. With the notable exception of the Erie Canal, most of these projects failed
to generate expected trade at significant cost expenditures. That experience led
many eastern states to shy away from water development activities.

In the next

century, western states would take the initiative in terms of water development,
the most notable case being the Central Valley Project in California in the 1960's.
Even in that

case,

state bond issue of $1. 75 billion dollars in 1960 provided

only half the promised water, and the Corps of

Engineers and Bureau of

Reclamation were called in to develop eight additional sites to meet projected
deficits.
Beyond legal basis and occasional development activities, state water policy
has evolved in two major time frames.

In the early part of this century, public

health concerns precipitated the formation of public health departments with
water quality

among the areas of focus.

The second major thrust came in the

1960's with the formation of the Water Resources Council at the federal level.
States were provided funding to develop a water planning framework. Out of this
initiative, most states either have developed or are developing comprehensive
water plans.
Still, in terms of relative importance, the New Federalism as evidenced in
the Water Resource Development Act of 1986 and the Clean Water Act of 1987
may have far greater effects on the responsibility of states with respect to water
finance than these earlier initiatives.

Increased cost sharing by state and local

participants in federal projects and state administration of revolving funds for
waste treatment facilities will result.

At the same time, separate infrastructure
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funds are being established at the state level for water and sewer construction and
renovation.

Local Role
Local government has played a primary role as provider of water.
100,000 entities including municipalities, counties, and public

service districts

operate in the U.S. delivering three-fourths of domestic water supply.
at the local

Some

Financing

level incorporates a complex set of instruments including water and

sewer receipts, local tax allocations, and elements from other institutional
•

sources, such as federal and state grants and loans and private sector investment.
In general, water delivery systems have been self-sufficient and/ or
revenue-generating.

Nevertheless, many public systems are inefficiently run

and replacement funds are typically underfunded or nonexistent.

Low interest

Farmers Home Administration loans have been a principal source of capital for
many small systems.

A demise of this program will place hardships on many

small systems unless an alternative funding mechanism is forthcoming.
Of far greater concern to local government is the future of federal support
for waste treatment programs. EPA, EDA, and HUD programs have been the source
of significant support over the past twenty years.

A restructuring and/or

elimination of these programs, as envisioned at this time, will have important
implications on the way that local water systems operate in the future. Complete
self-sufficiency, in terms of both water delivery and waste treatment, may force
higher water rates and a significant adjustment process particularly for small
rural systems.

Private Role
Of the nation's community water supply systems, 22 percent (some 33,000
systems) are privately or investor owned representing a rare case of defacto and
long-standing private sector involvement.

In the process, interrelationships

with other institutional elements have been established including rate regulation
at the state level and quality standards at the federal level.
A great deal of attention has been given in recent years to privatization as an
alternative to public service provision.

Among the options available are the

outright sale of government assets (like Conrail and water and sewer systems} to
more partnership-type schemes (like contracting out, sale-leaseback, and
development fees or contributions in aid of construction.)
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Despite its recent

popularity in some libertarian circles, not all publicly provided goods and
services are equally amenable to privatization.
subject to

Although water delivery is easily

efficiency tests, local governments may be, for that reason, less likely

to return this responsibility once already established.
Private capital markets may have a great deal to say about
arrangements particularly with respect to waste treatment facilities.

financial

Yet, recent

changes in federal tax law may alter dramatically the landscape of privatization
endeavors, as well as other private investment options.

The institutional

framework, especially elements related to the private sector, is, thus, in a
transitional state with a great deal of fluidity at this time.

PROBLEMS AND CAUSES

As noted earlier, the principal problem in terms of water resource
infrastructure appears to be a disequilibrium in capital markets. The section that
follows examines the present predicament with respect to water resource
infrastructure focusing in particular on

this overinvestment/u nderinvestment

paradox.

Overinvestment in Facilities

Water development activities often have been characterized by overkill, a
problem not unique in the U.S. but prevalent worldwide as well.

A part of the

problem can be attributed to monument building or over-engineering to
compensate for the shortcomings of natural processes.

There is no doubt that

these factors are important determinants in the scale of operations for
development projer.ts.

water

How is it that a little overzealousness has gotten out of

hand?
Consistent with this structural bias in meeting water needs, specifications
have often favored high-cost, high-technology solutions.
been goldplated capital facilities.
have been built in this way.

The result often has

Some of the engineering marvels of the world

Yet, construction costs have been high, as have

operation, maintenance, and repair costs (OM&R).
Another factor that has had significant influence on the level of
overinvestment in facilities particularly at the federal level has been the
authorization of multiple purpose projects.

It seems only logical that projects

providing multiple benefits be evaluated on a multiple purpose basis. Yet, the end
result of

this accounting precept was to allow considerably more latitude in the
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justification

of projects.

overestimated particularly

Independently,
in

irrigation

light of nationwide

agricultural commodities, and estimates

benefits

were

surpluses

often

in specific

of hydroelectric benefits ignored, at

times, supply and demand conditions in the service region. Collectively, pooled
benefit streams made project justification more likely.
The advent of river basin planning allows still further leeway in project
appraisal, as otherwise infeasible projects were combined for evaluation
purposes with high benefit producing projects within the same basin.

Productive

hydroelectric projects were able in this way to carry a number of otherwise
•

unjustifiable projects.
project evaluation.

Ultimately, flood control benefits played a large part in

Difficult to quantify in the first place, flood control benefits

did not have to be repaid, making cost recovery easier to realize.
Also contributing to overinvestment in facilities is the

step-wise scaling of

facilities. Often the choice is to under- or overbuild based on projected needs.
Given a general growth bias reflected in the decision-making process, the
tendency typically is to opt for the larger facility.

At the water delivery system

level, the large number of systems exacerbates this problem, resulting in over
capacity at the system level and a cumulative excess capacity areawide.
Compounding this problem is the growth bias alluded to above.

Optimistic

chambers of commerce and local officials often project phenomena growth for
their areas.

Betting on the outcome, communities frequently build excess

capacity, not wanting to lose potential industrial prospects or overestimating the
locational advantages of water and sewer capacity relative to other locational
deficiencies. More often than not in these circumstances, communities are saddled
with excessive debt burden and less than expected repayment capacity.
Lastly, perhaps the most important factor contributing to overinvestment in
facilities is the issue of who is paying for the project. When project beneficiaries
pay less than the full cost, incentives sway toward overinvestment.

Local

interests are less likely to be cost-conscious when the federal government picks
up the majority of the tab.

At the federal level, no other appropriation category

has been as susceptible to logrolling as water projects.
It can be argued rationally that some justification exists for investment in
water projects on the basis of economic development and flood control benefits or
for water treatment projects on the basis of public health benefits, all of which
may accrue beyond local boundaries.

Furthermore, access to

capital may be

necessary to allow projects to be built in the first place. Yet, the process seems
somehow out of synct; projects are too often justified on a political, rather than
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an economic basis.

Retrospective benefit/cost ratios too often fall short when

large-scale water projects are subjected to critical evaluation.

Underinvestment in Water Facilities

At the same time that overinvestment in facilities is occurring, a variety of
factors are contributing to an underinvestment in water facilities. Among the
factors pulling in the opposite direction is the financing of facilities through
appropriations.
•

By subjecting project budgets to annual appropriations, projects

invariably come on line too late, are in some cases undersized or otherwise
compromised, or are susceptible to possible diversion of funds.
Unpredictable institutional behavior runs beyond the issue of annual
appropriations. The present uncertainty of federal

grant programs has slowed

considerably water infrastructure investment. This uncertainty affects federal
cost sharing arrangements (PL99-662) as well as federal grant programs.
Project delays with bonded indebtedness often result in costs to local
participants.

With the Central Arizona Project, incentive clauses were attached

to alleviate the tie-up of local funds.

These incentives in turn, imposed an

opportunity cost on the U.S. Treasury.

Because there is a cost associated with

uncertainty, the greater the degree of uncertainty, the more likely it is that
suboptimal allocation decisions are made.
Although some of the positive spillover effects of projects may be
incorporated into the decision-making process, negative spillover effects often
have not been included. This point has been made dramatically in the case of the
Kesterson Wildlife Refuge where environmental effects of the Central Valley
Project in California were not fully conceived nor compensated. Drainage systems
to remove salt accumulation from irrigation projects and oxygen injection
systems for resevoirs, added later but not included in the original project design,
have become more common. A critical shortcoming of water resource development
efforts is that projects often have been underdesigned from an

environmental

systems perspective.
At the local level, inadequate fiscal capacity has been a significant problem
for many communities. Among the factors most responsible for this situation are
low user charges for water and sewer service often caused by political pressure
and limited bonding potential particularly among small communities.

The result

may be that the community is forced to maintain undersized and/or outdated
facilities.
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A final point that may influence investment in water facilities in the future,
although the outcomes are uncertain at this time, is the impact of federal tax
At the present time, it appears that the new law may restrict multiple

reform.

use projects. Yet, it may help traditional water supply.

Underinvestment in Operation, Maintenance and Repair

Investment in operation, maintenance and repair (OM&R) is influenced by
decisions made with respect to new facilities.

Perhaps most important in this

respect is the goldplated facilities syndrome referred to above. Highly engineered
facilities entail expensive maintenance requirements.

Yet, subsidies and low

interest loans typically are earmarked for new facilities at the expense of OM&R,
new facilities being more impressive than comparatively mundane maintenance
and repair activity. As a result, financial incentives discourage OM&R
expenditures

allowing existing facilities to deteriorate while available

funds are

targeted for new construction.
A second factor at work is the out-of-sight-out-of-mind management style
that characterizes water and sewer infrastructure. Psychologically, it seems
easier to forego maintenance and repair work with equipment that is not
visible--underground pipes being the extreme case. Tight maintenance budgets
and the

hidden nature of the system reinforce a "don't-fix-it-if-it-ain't-broke"

way of doing business. The tendency then is to wait until something breaks before
repairs are done, rather than to practice preventive maintenance.
Finally, OM&R activities fall victim to the whims of the political business
cycle.

Where infrastructure appropriations are made in a political setting those

decisions are subject to the most relevant time horizons for elected officials, i.e.,
election periods of two, four, or six years.

Project dedications generate a great

deal more political capital back home than do OM&R appropriations.

As such,

short-term political payoffs are inconsistent with long-run efficiencies in
capital facilities planning.
The end result of this situation is that water and sewer infrastructure in
many U.S. cities is badly in need of repair, renovation, and replacement.

It is

estimated that the cost of repairing America's deteriorating water and sewer
4
infrastrucure will be close to $200 billion by the year 2000. Costs continue to

escalate so that further delays will bring still higher costs in the future.

It is

imperative, therefore, that creative ways to maintain this aging infrastructure be
developed before still further deterioration occurs.
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OPTIONS FOR FINANCING WATER RESOURCE INFRASTRUCTURE
The paradox of over/underinvestment in water resource infrasructure has
become serious with deteriorating facilities and insufficient capacity on the one
hand and over capacity on the other hand.
fundamental

If this distortion is to be addressed,

institutional changes will be required in the way that capital

markets operate for water resource investments.

The following

chapter will try

to sketch guidelines for doing so.

THE POLICY FRAMEWORK
It would be naive to ignore the fact that water resource allocations are made
in the political arena where projects are often evaluated in terms of political,
rather than financial, capital.

As such, a quite different scrutiny is applied.

Still, it can be argued that, for good or bad, this system allowed for the
application of collective resources: to develop engineering marvels of the modern
world, to open the West, and to tame many of the continent's great rivers.
Yet, the rules of the game may have changed. Significant federal deficits that
have surfaced over the past decade are forcing a more critical review of federal
expenditures.

As noted earlier, real federal expenditures for natural resource

programs peaked in 1965, while nominal expenditures peaked in 1980.

Since

that time, water development expenditures have fallen, and it seems unlikely that
significantly larger shares of the federal budget will be diverted, save a national
catastrophe.
In addition, as with any resource development endeavor, the
have been developed first as a rule.

Changing demand

best projects

and technology may

influence the relative ranking of projects, but from an engineering and hydrologic
standpoint at time of construction, the best projects are behind us. The projects
that remain for

future development generally will entail less favorable physical

attributes, higher costs of delivery, lower benefit streams, or some

combination

of these characteristics relative to earlier projects. In a slightly different way,
the same analogy holds for water quality projects as incremental pollution control
projects become exponentially more costly.
If future water projects are to be cost effective, a different litmus test will
need to be developed to evaluate the financial viability of proposed projects.
Greater emphasis will need to be placed on full cost pricing of water resources and
on the appropriation of project costs to more closely match project benefits.
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Multiple Purpose Projects

Water resource projects are rarely one-dimensional.

Instead, projects

often involve some combination of benefits including, but not limited to, flood
control, irrigation, hydropower, navigation, and municipal and industrial water
supply.

The appropriation of project benefits among water uses is difficult but

necessary if resources are to be allocated effectively.

Benefit-cost techniques

evolved specifically to provide a more objective means of evaluating water
resource projects.
Yet, despite this methodological framework, the decision-making process
remains less than rational.

In actuality, the calculus of water resource finance is

less precise than its outward rigor and air of objectivity might suggest.

Some

project benefits are less tangible than others and thereby more susceptible to
interpretation and honest debate among those of different philosophical leanings.
The intangible nature of many project benefits allows for significant latitude in
the allocation of benefit streams and creativity in terms of cost recovery schemes.
Central to this issue is the question of who actually pays for the project.

Beneficiary Pay Principle
The beneficiary pay principle is premised on the assertion that costs are
most appropriately borne by beneficaries.

This principle is consistent in

concept with highest and best use conditions where resources are allocated to
activities offering the highest return.
resources

As costs are borne by beneficiaries,

are committed only in cases where benefits are equal to or exceed

costs. Where tangible benefits accrue, such as in the case of water supply and
hydro projects, full cost recovery should be apportioned

to project beneficiaries.

Such benefits are consistent with market processes where individual users pay
appropriate shares of project costs and make individual decisions as to their level
of use.
Failure to capture full project costs leads ultimately to

overutilization of

the resource and, in terms of project planning, to overcapitalization of
infrastructure.
guidelines.

As such, full cost pricing is a critical element of water finance

Likewise, cost deferral to other project uses, especially where those

costs are not recoverable, or pricing based upon less than the true opportunity
cost of capital are likely to lead to unabated demand. Where subsidization results
in hidden costs, resource allocations are more apt to be suboptimal.
Demand for subsidized irrigation water and hydropower remain high, while
the lack of funding for maintenance and repair of municipal water lines
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discourages their upkeep.

No cost recovery provisions encourage flood control

projects while effects on downstream users go unaccounted. Important here is the
proration of public and private benefits allocating private benefits to appropriate
user groups and public benefits collectively among local beneficiaries and the
larger national interest with respect to

water resources.

Water Resource Development

In general, water resource development activities are more tangible and
•

therefore more amenable to market forces than are water quality projects. Water
supply and hydro delivery are typically metered, and compelling efficiency
concerns argue for full cost recovery. In this context, cost recovery should be
based on the opportunity cost of capital reflecting market interest rates and,
part icu Iar Iy du ri ng inf Iat io nary ti m es, v a Iuin g capita I assets at cu r re nt or
replacement costs rather than at original purchase price.
Applying these yardsticks, most of the water development projects currently
on the books are significantly undervalued .

An immediate shift to full cost

financing would send shock waves through water markets. This distortion effect,
falling hardest on those that invested significant amounts of capital with the
expectation of predetermined water rates, suggests that any change that may occur
be done so gradually.

These changes should be reflected in new projects or

reauthorizations or phased in over an extended time period.
The other principal water development activities, flood control and
navigation, are less able to isolate beneficiaries than are water supply and
hydropower. In the case of flood control, localized benefits should be apportioned
to assure local commitment and to assist with cost recovery.

Ultimately,

however, the solution is not to build in flood hazard areas or to let developers bear
flood control costs where flood hazards can or should be anticipated.

Existing

development should be subjected to stringent benefit-cost analysis with relocation
considered as an option before new projects are begun.
With navigation, it remains difficult to isolate economic development
benefits for cost recovery purposes.

Still, a greater reliance on user fees and

local cost sharing seem likely with a favorable long-run effect from an efficiency
standpoint.
One of the most promising philosophic shifts in this direction was the
passage of the Water Resource Development Act of 1986 alluded to above.
Although the legislation is project specific, it may reflect a new approach toward
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the authorization of federal projects with stricter project guidelines and more
significant local cost-sharing provisions.

Water Quality
Water quality issues do not conform well to political boundaries and are,
therefore, more difficult than water development projects to apportion.

In that

sense, there is an active role for government beyond the local level to assure
water quality with technical assistance as well as subsidies and/or penalties. To
the extent possible, internalization of negative impacts on water quality should be
pursued through monitoring and charges on polluters.
Significant expansion, upgrading, and new construction of waste treatment
facilities, for which access to capital markets will be necessary, will be required
between now and the end of the century. The Clean Air Act of 1987 represents an
important financial policy statement in this regard.

By setting up revolving loan

pools in each of the states, the federal government is forcing a greater state
presence. This delegation of responsibility does not assume necessarily that states
will be above political pressure in enacting their programs, but it acknowledges
the need for greater state and local decision-making involvement.

Perhaps even

more importantly, the transition from a grant to a loan pool program will help to
prioritize viable projects.

Of critical concern will be the interest rates and loan

guidelines to be established by states which will help to determine the long-term
stability of state programs.
Related to water quality issues in some respects are environmental impacts
of water development projects. Like water quality concerns, environmental
spillovers must be assessed and

accounted for as a project cost .

At times,

environmental impacts have been ignored and at other times not fully
comprehended at the time of construction. Reduced oxygen levels, resevoir silta
tion, and sodium deposits in irrigated soils have and/or will result in significant
costs.

Although O&M funds exist to deal with such issues, it seems likely that

those reserves may be seriously underfunded for some of these long-term costs.
No provision exists for such catastrophic effects as the environmental damage
inflicted at Kesterson.

Cost recovery provisions should be dynamic to allow

undervalued or unanticipated spillover effects to be absorbed as a project cost.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Capital markets for water resource infrastructure often are out of synct. To
better balance the commitment of financial resources in terms of water
infrastructure, reassessment of these markets is necessary.

In particular,

the

process will require the adherence to sound financial principles if outcomes are to
be more optimal.

Guidelines for promoting more effective resources allocations

in terms of over- and underinvestment in water-related infrastructure are
suggested below.

Overinvestment in Infrastructure

-

Water infrastructure should be subject to full cost financing.

Hidden

costs invariably lead to to overinvestment in capital facilities.
-

Costs should be borne by project beneficiaries and prorated among
private and public interests.

Subsidization should be employed only

where public benefits exist and are not recoverable through private user
fees.

-

Higher cost sharing for public aspects of water projects should be borne
by local entities as most benefits can be localized and to assure resource
commitments only for financially sound projects.

-

O&M and environmental effects should be included as project costs with
adjustments made over the project life where funds are insufficient to
meet project induced costs.

-

Funding criteria must be rational and strictly adhered to if projects are
to be prioritized on sound financial principles.

Underinvestment in Infrastructure

-

Project costs should not be subject to annual appropriations that may
alter

project

design

after

authorization

and

in

turn

lead

to

underinvestment in facilities.

-

Public

health

and

environmental

side

effect

costs

are

often

underappropriated. , These effects should be absorbed by project
beneficiaries.

-

Private user fees are often too low relative to maintenance and
replacement of capital stock.

Depreciation funds should reflect current

value of plant and equipment.

-

Long-range infrastructure planning
political expediency.
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must supersede planning

for

General Recommendations
-

The institutional environment must be predictable.

Uncertainty bears a

cost in capital markets and often leads to suboptimal outcomes.
-

Regionalization of water facilities beyond political boundaries should be
encouraged to account for economies-of-scale and to decrease the
cumulative effect of the over/undercapitalization problem .

-

Access to capital markets must be provided with capital costs reflecting
true market rates.
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FOOTNOTES
1

William H. Lee, "Estimating New York Water Supply Needs," Engineering

Foundation

Conference on

Financial

and

Amortizing

Water

Resource

Infrastructure at Palm Coast, Florida, March 29 - April 3, 1987.
2

The cost to upgrade water delivery systems has been estimated at $3.7

billion/year by the Joint Economic Committee, $4.4 billion/year by the
American Water Works Association and $5.9 to $7.6 billion/year by the
Congressional Budget Office.

Figures compiled from the National Council on

Public Works Improvement, Report to the President and Congress, 1986.
3

Office of Municipal Pollution Control, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

Current estimates on costs to meet clean water standards.
4

A compilation of annual costs for water delivery systems and EPA estimates

for waste treatment facilities from footnotes 2 and 3 above.

Figures are in

constant dollars.
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